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This study examines whether North Korea can be a part of the SDG process as a fragile 
state under sanctions. The paper focuses on the accountability mechanism of the SDG 
implementation process, and analyses how North Korea has engaged in the process and 
what needs to be addressed to achieve ‘leave no one behind’ principle of the SDGs. The 
findings of the study reveal that North Korea can engage in the SDG process, but only 
when a culture of accountability develops in its society and government structure. This 
study suggests employing the concept of ‘transitional accountability’. Finally, the study 
argues that a constructive accountability approach can be more effective than a punitive 
one, especially in fragile states under sanctions.  
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I. Introduction  
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In September 2015, member countries of the United Nations (UN) agreed 
to continue to pursue a platform of global goals, named the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs), as a successor to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Before the SDGs were agreed, there was a series of interna-
tional meetings on the implementation process of global goals, based on their 
predecessors, the MDGs. Four High Level Forums (HLFs) were held by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC). This series of meetings began in 2003 
with a donor harmonisation discussion in Rome, Italy, and continued in the 
2005 discussion about aid effectiveness in boosting MDG implementation in 
Paris, France. In 2008, the discussion continued during the third OECD DAC 
HLF in Accra, Ghana, by emphasising the importance of new actors like civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
new aid modalities including South-South Cooperation and Triangular Coop-
eration, and new approaches to fragile states, followed by the fourth OECD 
DAC HLF, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
(GPEDC), in Busan, South Korea, in 2011.  
These OECD DAC HLFs were converted into the format of the series of 
the GPEDC high level meetings, not only led by OECD but also with the UN. 
The very first meeting was held in Mexico in 2014 to discuss the unfinished 
business of MDG implementation in review of what was met and what was 
not met, and provided lessons learned for SDGs. One of the main areas where 
the implementation principles still lagged behind MDG implementation, and 
thus, needed to be continued in the SDG implementation mechanism, was 
mutual accountability. However, accountability in development cooperation 
has not been fully analysed yet in academic discourse. At the same time, while 
attention to fragile states was heavily emphasised during the third OECD 
DAC HLF in 2008, this seems to have faded, and it has remained an orphan 
pillar in the international goals’ implementation process. Even though an in-
creasing amount of research has been conducted in terms of fragile states and 
development cooperation, little of it has dealt with North Korea as a case in 
this area of study. Furthermore, even though SDGs have set out the funda-
mental principle of ‘leave no one behind’, countries like North Korea do not 
seem to be a part of the SDGs in terms of donor support, especially when it 
comes to the people at grassroots level under sanctions. Existing sanctions 
have limited even the basic level of requirement of international development 
support in the country (FAO/WFP, 2019).  
Sojin Lim / Journal of Peace and Unification 11(1) 55-78  57 
 
 
With this in mind, this paper aims to fill this gap by answering its research 
questions of whether we can still apply SDG discourse to North Korea even 
though it is under sanctions, and if so, in what context and how this could be 
done. This study addresses two interweaving unfinished pillars of accounta-
bility and fragility from the MDGs by exploring recent developments in the 
SDG implementation mechanism. This paper defines North Korea as a fragile 
state based on various fragile indices and its status as a country under sanc-
tions. This has been dealt with in more detail in the later section of the paper. 
In the end, it intends to provide implications for fragile states deriving from 
the case of North Korea, which is one of the most severely ignored countries 
with the excuse that we do not have access to data to analyse in the develop-
ment cooperation context and that it is not appropriate to discuss it pending 
the nuclear threat and the country’s sanctioned status. It is noteworthy that 
this paper does not intend to examine the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
sanctions, but rather attempts to provide policy recommendations for how 
fragile states, especially under sanctions, can be a part of the SDGs by pro-
moting ‘tailored’ accountability.  
 
 
II. Accountability in Development Cooperation 
   
1. Accountability in Theory 
 
As seen in Figure 1, accountability can be achieved by policy dialogues 
and trust building activities between partners mutually at the initial stage (re-
sponsibility), while data and information sharing, peer review and/or mutual 
assessment follow when the accountability mechanism between partners be-
comes more mature (answerability). When any legal claims occur in this pro-
cess, accountability among partners can end up with an inspection panel, 
compliance review and/or resettlement (enforceability).  
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Figure 1. Accountability Mechanism in Development Cooperation  
(Kim & Lim, 2017: 198) 
 
At the stage of responsibility, exploring shared responsibility and policy 
integration need to be addressed by analysing who is capable of responding 
to the targeted issues. Based on a strongly shared responsibility, partners can 
enhance accountability of their activities, which continues to the next stage 
(Kim & Lim, 2017). At this level, the process of accountability conceptuali-
sation must be accompanied with (Das, 2018). 
In answerability processes, partners normally set up a monitoring process, 
along with continuous integration and information sharing in a way to meas-
ure behavioural efforts and objectively verifiable indicators of outcomes (Fu-
kuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018). Because this 
stage involves ‘measuring’ progress against target indicators, in some exist-
ing literature answerability is interchangeably used with ‘countability’ (Fu-
kuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015). In order to achieve the maturity of accountabil-
ity, conducting the answerability stage successfully is critical. However, more 
importantly, securing transparency at this stage can be very critical in terms 
of empowering people through free information flow available to the popu-
lace.  
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The enforceability stage comes as the last resort because it is hardly ever 
possible to impose any formal enforcement between independent sovereignty 
partners (Kim & Lim, 2017; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018). However, 
while establishing the formal process of ‘punishment’ at the enforceability 
stage is the biggest challenge of the accountability mechanism, it can be un-
derstood as the loop for creating an opportunity within the ‘act and remedy’ 
process (Das, 2018; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018). Based on the answer-
ability process (monitor and review), if there are issues which go wrong, 
based on the formal investigation, necessary changes can be applied based on 
ownership by each partner in the process, at least in theory. 
Accountability can be understood in ‘different forms’, including adminis-
trative, political, national legal, and international procedures at the interna-
tional level. Das (2018) emphasises the importance of political/legislative ac-
countability, legal accountability, and individual and constructive accounta-
bility in order to create a ‘culture of accountability’ at the country level, es-
pecially when the country lacks a historical avenue for accountability. Simi-
larly, accountability can be interpreted within the scope of ‘policy integration’ 
at the national level (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018). If there is negligence 
of accountability in the historical account, it is easy for a country to lack ‘ad-
ministrative’ accountability. Also, it is easier for a country to impose punitive 
measures rather than provide constructive enforceability, which could limit 
necessary systemic reforms in place (Das, 2018). In the end, these will depend 
on how much state power can create an environment that enables state ac-
countability. At the same time, conceptualising accountability needs to be in 
consensus; otherwise it can complicate the process of legalising and constitu-
tionalising accountability mechanisms in the government system (Das, 2018).  
At the international level, especially with global norms such as SDGs, it 
becomes more critical to materialise and integrate the global norms and un-
derstandings into the accountability process and structure at the national level 
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018). Also, global norms are often not auto-
matically integrated into the national level norm creation process (Bowen et 
al., 2017). This, in turn, means that either global norms and processes need to 
be more robust so that they can be embedded at the national level, or a formal 
enforceability needs to be enforced through parliament or audit institutions at 
the national level (Bowen et al., 2017; Das, 2018). With this in mind, global 
governance and state accountability may need to be reformed by putting ac-
tual necessary enforcement in place rather than playing with language in de-
velopment debates (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015).  
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2. Accountability in Practice 
 
There was criticism that the MDGs were not successful partially due to the 
lack of accountability. As mentioned in the previous section, the final stage 
of accountability can be achieved by the enforceability system. However, as 
there was no such accountability system for the MDGs, countries were free 
from non-binding MDGs – there was no such sanctions or other kinds of re-
actions even though countries did not meet their MDG targets by the end of 
2015. Based on this background, the UN High Level Forum began to talk 
about a paradigm shift from ‘data revolution’ to ‘accountability revolution’ 
(UN, 2013). Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also pointed out 
that the biggest obstacle was the lack of accountability in achieving the MDGs 
(Donald & Way, 2016). Initially, there was a consensus that we needed to 
have stronger accountability mechanisms at the initial discussion, such as 
‘multi-layered accountability architecture’, which addresses all local, na-
tional, regional and global level accountability in the form of states to their 
people. However, due to the ‘politics of accountability’, the member countries 
of the UN could not decide upon a concrete accountability mechanism but 
compromised the current Follow-up and Review Architecture (FRA) as an 
accountability platform for the SDGs in the form of the Voluntary National 
Review (VNR), which is in between the global and national levels (Donald 
and Way, 2016).  
The VNR of the FRA was not designed as ‘states-to-people’ accountability, 
but rather as a ‘peer review’ mechanism, mainly due to the lack of political 
will (Donald & Way, 2016). According to the theory mentioned previously 
(Figure 1), peer review can work well in the accountability process at the an-
swerability stage because it can provide a new avenue of conditions (also see 
Donald & Way, 2016). While enforceability is based on a ‘punitive’ ap-
proach, which tends to provide punishment rather than offer conditions to re-
vise failure, a ‘constructive’ approach in accountability proposes processes to 
‘monitor, review, act and remedy’ based on the peer review exercise (Das, 
2018). 
As the FRA is voluntary, it is loosely bounded by UN members. Therefore, 
the importance of the national judicial mechanism has been emphasised es-
pecially under accountability mechanisms like SDG FRA (Donald & Way, 
2016; Das, 2018). A robust national judicial mechanism which addresses 
SDGs in the system can bring national, corporate, and social accountability. 
At the same time, both informal and formal accountability systems can be 
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imposed in hierarchical and horizontal accountability mechanisms at the na-
tional level through the imposition of a formal mandate (Karlsson-Vink-
huyzen et al., 2018). At the international level, accountability mechanisms 
can be imposed either punitively or horizontally. It is important to ensure that 
the accountability mechanism is embedded in the domestic legal system as a 
formal mandate. 
Furthermore, engagement with SDG accountability can also be incentiv-
ised, rather than imposed through enforceability measures which are in fact 
difficult to implement in reality. Therefore, by accepting the limits of the SDG 
accountability platform, we can utilise constructive rather than punitive meth-
ods to ensure accountability. In this way, as Donald and Way (2016) suggest, 
we can provide conditions such as more financial and/or technical support to 
those countries which achieve SDG targets in the given timeframe. History 
shows that soft law or non-binding commitments such as VNR cannot work 
as external pressure for member countries, and thus, need to be reconsidered 
in such a way as to introduce constructive accountability and incentive mech-
anisms into the SDG FRA platform. 
In the SDG accountability mechanisms, it has been pointed out that it is 
unclear how to collect data and information and how to develop data collec-
tion methods to make accountability a successful part of the process (Wil-
liams & Hunt, 2017). The existing SDG indicators do not appear to have been 
designed for accountability from the outset. This suggests that we need to 
introduce additional indicators dedicated to data and information collection 
for accountability, and to develop the accountability capacity of countries 
(Williams & Hunt, 2017).  
 
 
III. Fragile States in Development Cooperation 
  
1. Fragile States in Theory 
 
While there was a level of consideration of state fragility in development 
cooperation in the late 1990s, a systemic approach was only initiated during 
the second OECD DAC HLF in 2005. After the second OECD DAC HLF in 
2005, the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Frag-
ile States and Situations (also known as Fragile States Principles) were 
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adopted in 2007, and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (IN-
CAF) was established in 2008 (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012). Since then, the 
INCAF has published ‘States of Fragility’ reports annually to maintain the 
importance of a differentiated approach to fragile states in the context of de-
velopment cooperation. When the third OECD DAC HLF was held in 2008, 
aid stakeholders discussed three new agendas (OECD, 2008). The represent-
atives in the third OECD DAC HLF invited CSOs and NGOs as critical part-
ners in development cooperation, revisited the effectiveness of South-South 
Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation, and considered the need for a dif-
ferentiated approach to fragile states (OECD, 2008; Lim, 2019a). In particu-
lar, the international development community agreed to establish a new set of 
approaches to fragile states, and the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States (also known as New Deal)’ was introduced in 2011 (Nussbaum et al., 
2012; Hingorani, 2015). The New Deal was agreed by the International Dia-
logue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) in the middle of the MDG 
implementation process, thereby recognising the urgent need to address chal-
lenges in fragile and conflict-affected states (Williams et al., 2017).  
Since then, academics as well as policymakers in the field of development 
discourse have reflected state fragility in their discussion and analysis 
(Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012). From the various fragile indexes produced by 
different entities, it also seems that state fragility is now understood in a more 
specific way based on various indicators which much more specific than other 
categorisations of developing countries (Nussbaum, Zorbas, & Koros, 2012; 
Alonso, Cortez, & Klasen, 2014). However, no definition of fragile states has 
yet found a concrete common ground (Nussbaum et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, academic research on fragile states appears to split into three 
main categories: discussion of the definition and concept of fragile states 
(Grimm et al., 2014; Kaplan, 2014; Carlsen & Bruggemann, 2017); situa-
tional analysis of development cooperation in fragile states and its implica-
tions (Besley & Persson, 2011; Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012; Cartier-Bresson, 
2012; Call, 2016); and how or what to do for fragile states in development 
cooperation policy and practice (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Bennet, 2013; Bøås, 
2017). The main takeaway from this contemporary fragile state discussion is 
that we need to address the core causes of fragility in fragile states. At the 
same time, the definition of fragility needs to be distinguished between en-
demic and situational/episodic (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012). In order to pro-
vide appropriate development cooperation to fragile states, it is critical to fo-
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cus on country-led sustainable capacity development to achieve socio-eco-
nomic change, including external development aid management capability 
(Brinkerhoff, 2010; Newbrander et al., 2012). 
 
2. Fragile States in Practice 
 
While it is argued that accountability is necessary for successful SDG im-
plementation, it is also claimed that addressing fragility is critical to provide 
a smarter development assistance for SDGs (OECD, 2015; 2018). MDG pro-
gress was very slow in fragile states in general, and most fragile states failed 
to achieve the MDGs (OECD, 2015; Williams et al., 2017). This was because 
there was a lack of focus on fragile states when the MDGs were delivered 
(OECD, 2015).  
However, with the adoption of the New Deal, some fragile states began to 
benefit from it. While it was reported that no single fragile state achieved the 
MDGs by 2009, certain progress has been observed since 2011 based on fra-
gility assessment and country-tailored development strategies in fragile 
states, especially g7+ countries (Mayar, 2014). The categorisation of ‘g7+’ 
was created in opposition to ‘G7’ countries in order to indicate fragile states 
with a small ‘g’, while a capital ‘G’ stands for the world’s leading countries. 
Accordingly, the New Deal has been further developed into the SDG imple-
mentation process, especially through contributing to the creation of SDG 
Goal 16, Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (Williams et al., 2017). An 
SDG core principle is ‘leave no one behind’, and the IDPS has made it clear 
that the SDGs should consider different aspects of countries, including na-
tional capacities and development levels, and thus, must provide differenti-
ated approaches to fragile and/or post-conflict and in conflict countries. This 
embraces the need to address both technical and political obstacles to devel-
opment progress by identifying the root causes of fragility in countries. In 
light of this, it has been emphasised that the New Deal must be included in 
the process of SDG implementation in fragile states (New Deal Ad hoc Work-
ing Group on Agenda 2030 and the New Deal, 2017).  
In accordance, the UNDP has implemented SDG-ready projects, which is 
a tailored support to SDG implementation in the context of fragility. In rela-
tion to this, the UNDP has provided the Mainstreaming, Acceleration, and 
Policy Support (MAPS) for member states to take a common approach to 
fragile states. MAPS was not designed under the MDG paradigm, but when 
the SDGs were agreed they were integrated into the process. The UNDP has 
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also established the fragility-sensitive approach (FSA) which can be applied 
to MAPS in order to support SDG implementations in fragile states. The FSA 
of the UNDP makes it clear that not only conflicts, but also factors such as 
levels of resilience against natural disaster, risk of shocks and stresses, and 
people dynamics need to be taken into consideration when defining state fra-
gility (UNDP, 2016). In comparison, OECD has suggested we re-consider the 
way fragility is measured in achieving SDGs by focusing more on risk diver-
sity and vulnerability in fragile states. This is because even among fragile 
states, capacity needs and development levels are different (OECD, 2015). 
However, in the SDG context, it has been pointed out that the monitoring 
process is a ‘particular burden’ for fragile states as they lack the required ca-
pacity to monitor the progress of SDG implementation. Likewise, it has been 
proven that capacity enhancement can be highly important for fragile states 
to achieve socio-economic progress by finding a path from fragility to devel-
opment (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that capacity de-
velopment also needs to be differentiated by country’s capacity levels, and 
also by areas of capacity (Newbrander et al., 2012). 
 
 
IV. Methodology and Analytical Framework 
 
This paper has been conducted using a qualitative methodology, including 
case study and interview methods. As there was highly limited access to in-
formation regarding North Korea, interviews played a critical role in this pa-
per, in particular for the purposes of triangulation. However, it needs to be 
addressed that conducting interviews, especially with international organisa-
tions, was particularly difficult as the situation surrounding North Korea dur-
ing the research period was very unreliable. For example, it was clearly stated 
that the UNDP has experienced a very sensitive period on issues relating to 
North Korea (Interview 18). Similarly, interviewees expressed their concerns 
of revealing information such as their affiliated organisations and position 
titles. They agreed that the knowledge and information obtained from the in-
terviews can be used only indirectly. Accordingly, much of the content from 
the interviews has not been explicitly stated in this research due to such re-
quests from the interviewees. Furthermore, details about each interviewee 
have been carefully encoded, and the list of interviewees in the reference 
shows limited personal information about them. However, the context is fully 
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reflected in terms of approach and understanding of the issue related to the 
research. On top of that, a series of interviews has provided fruitful insights 
in this research and helped this study to become stronger in terms of balancing 
different views and understandings.  
This research defines FRA with the VNR as the SDG accountability mech-
anism. In the SDG paradigm, the FRA as a data sharing platform can be in-
terpreted as the process in the answerability stage of the accountability mech-
anism. As explained, accountability can be understood as three main stages, 
emphasizing the importance of transparency and free information flow to em-
power people. While transparency can contribute to less state fragility, capac-
ity development also needs to be paralleled. However, as the global level SDG 
accountability mechanism, which is FRA, remains purely voluntary, a legally 
binding accountability mechanism needs to be established at the national 
level. In light of this, this paper sets out an analytical framework based on the 
argument analysed from the existing literature that the independent thematic 
expert groups need to be introduced at the international level in conjunction 
with the SDG FRA system, while legalising and constitutionalising account-
ability mechanisms in the government system that need to be practiced, by 
drawing political attention to the SDG accountability at the national level.  
At the same time, this paper reflects a constructive approach rather than a 
punitive one at the level of enforceability. While effective in theory, punitive 
measures can rarely be imposed in reality and thus a constructive approach 
can be more effective and efficient in practice. By adopting an international 
incentive system at the domestic level, more engagement of the SDG imple-
mentation and data sharing process can be promoted. As previously noted, 
accountability needs to be embedded in the culture, and appropriate process 
of conceptualising accountability is required in consensus. Experience has 
shown that the neo-liberal approach of ‘one size fits all’ is not effective, and 
therefore we need to consider the different situations prevailing in each coun-
try and thus apply ‘transitional accountability’ in conceptualising accounta-
bility in the culture by taking more flexible range, time, and resources. When 
applying the ‘transitional accountability’ approach to fragile states as one of 
the forms of international incentives, the international community can boost 
the capacity development of fragile governments as another form of incen-
tives for engaging and providing data and information related to the SDGs. 
As measurable and customized information and data collection methods are 
required in the FRA process, those who actively participate in this process 
can bring more attention to capacity development as incentives from donor 
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governments. In the end, it is evident that external soft law pressure, such as 
global norms and the FRA, cannot force governments to comply, and there-




V. A Case of North Korea 
 
1. North Korea as a Fragile State 
 
According to various existing fragile states indexes, North Korea is a de 
facto fragile state. For example, the OECD’s ‘States of Fragility’ report series 
defines North Korea as a fragile state (for instance, OECD, 2018). In compar-
ison, the World Bank also produces a fragile index known as the ‘Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)’ (Feeny et al., 2015: 1075). How-
ever, these fragile indices by international organisations have a political nexus 
(Grimm, 2014; Nay, 2014), and thus, it is critical to triangulate these indices 
with those produced by more independent bodies as follows. In comparison, 
the UNDP fragility definition includes resilience levels in the case of natural 
disaster, such as floods, people living in extreme poverty and the context of 
their dynamics, and environmentally vulnerable and political fragile situa-
tions (see also UNDP 2016). In this paper, we include such factors as vulner-
ability of people at risk under international sanctions in the definition of fra-
gility, especially in relation to the latter part of the UNDP definition. 
Among others, the Global Peace Index (GPI) published by the Institute for 
Economics and Peace (IEP), the Fragile States Index (FSI) published by the 
Fund for Peace (FFP), the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) pub-
lished by the CIFP Project, and the Index of State Weakness in the Develop-
ing World (ISW) published by the Brookings Institution have all been leading 
fragility indices, and North Korea has been categorised as a fragile state by 
all of these indices. In more detail, the GPI measures 163 countries’ peace-
fulness level based on 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators. These in-
clude indices of safety and security, ongoing conflict, and militarisation (IEP, 
2018). In comparison, the FSI ranks 178 states’ fragility using the FFP’s Con-
flict Assessment System Tool (CAST). CAST uses the method of ‘compre-
hensive social science approach’ based on content analysis, quantitative data, 
and qualitative review process (FFP, 2018). In the case of the CIFP, the CIFP 
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Project has employed the so-called ‘ALC approach’, which measures Author-
ity, Legitimacy, and the Capacity of countries as measures of fragility (Car-
ment et al., 2013). Finally, the ISW uses ‘state weakness’ rather than ‘fragil-
ity’ in its measurement ranking 141 countries. It examines economic, politi-
cal, security, and social welfare performance of states (Rice & Patrick, 2008).  
However, some scholars who deal with North Korean issues have ex-
pressed perceptions and understandings that differ from the aforementioned 
fragility indices. According to them, North Korea is politically stable despite 
its long-term dictatorship – some say that ironically North Korea is stable due 
to its strong dictatorship, and thus, it is not fragile in a sense of potential state 
collapse (Interviews 11; 12; 14; 15; 16; 23). At the same time, it was also said 
that North Korea’s continued economic survival even after tremendous natu-
ral disasters in the 1990s and continued international sanctions prove that this 
country is not fragile (Interviews 9; 10; 11; 14; 21; 22; 23). However, these 
academics were not fully aware of existing fragile states indices as their very 
first question was always ‘what does “fragile states” mean?’. Due to this lack 
of familiarity with the concept of fragile states, they tended to provide their 
individual views on North Korea as a non-fragile state, except one academic 
among interviewees. According to this interviewee, North Korea is fragile at 
least in the social development context based on the interviewee’s experience 
of visiting North Korea – not major cities but villages (Interview 13). Another 
interviewee who was a secondee from the South Korean government to the 
World Bank mentioned that the concept of fragile states was unfamiliar to her 
even though she was working for the World Bank long enough (Interview 9). 
This confirms the findings from the existing study arguing that the concept of 
fragile states has not been universal (see Grimm, 2014; Nay, 2014).  
In the case of international organisations, views on North Korea’s fragility 
vary. It is said that the UNDP does not consider North Korea to be a fragile 
state (Interviews 7; 8) while the European Union (EU) does classify North 
Korea as a fragile state (Interview 17). While the reason why the UNDP does 
not classify North Korea as a fragile state was not given (Interviews 7; 8), it 
was said that the topic of North Korea has been highly sensitive for the UNDP 
at the moment as there has been discussions on whether it should maintain its 
office in Pyongyang (Interview 18). In the case of the EU, it treats North Ko-
rea as a fragile state based on internal characteristics by employing criteria 
such as economic, political, environmental, and social development (Inter-
view 17). The unclear positioning of some international organisations about 
state fragility has been discussed in the existing research as well (Grimm, 
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2014; Nay, 2014). Contrary to this, aid workers or researchers in the govern-
ment sector in South Korea tend to categorise North Korea as a fragile state 
(Interviews 1; 2; 22). One interviewee who is a well-known researcher on 
North Korea in South Korea perceived that 99 percent of people would con-
sider North Korea to be a fragile state as the country situation in general is 
highly fragile. He particularly emphasised as an example the financial sector 
in North Korea (Interview 20). However, this does not mean that they are 
aware of fragility indices, but their understanding of state fragility was limited 
to the sectors in which they have been involved. Common ground for those 
who perceive North Korea as a fragile state derives from the fact that North 
Korea cannot achieve necessary levels of development by itself, but only 
through external support. In comparison, at the ministry level, opinions vary 
once again. For example, among those interviewed, junior level officials in 
the South Korean government tend to define North Korea as a fragile state 
due to its economic, social, and human rights status (Interviews 4; 5) while a 
senior official clearly stated that North Korea is not a fragile state, especially 
when it comes to its political stability (Interview 3). Again, none of these 
officials were familiar with the various fragility indices at the international 
level. 
This series of interviews confirmed that views on North Korea in the con-
text of fragile states tend to derive from individual understanding or experi-
ence, and thus existing fragile states indices have not yet been thoroughly 
explored when it comes to the case of North Korea. This implies that it is 
necessary to build up a more consensus approach towards North Korea, espe-
cially in the process of development cooperation. In light of this, this study 
argues that North Korea should be considered as a fragile state based on more 
objective categorisations rather than relying on individual conceptualisations 
of the country. Also, it is noteworthy that a further study is required with more 
in-depth surveys among experts on North Korea in order to understand how 
they define North Korea’s status. The number of interviewees for this study 
is not sufficient to generalise, which remains a limitation of the research. 
 
2. SDGs and Accountability in North Korea 
 
North Korea is working on its VNR to be published in 2019 or 2020. North 
Korea made a request to the President of the UN Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) to present its VNR in 2019; however, by the time the interview 
was conducted in 2019, the 2019 list was closed had not yet North Korea 
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submitted its VNR yet. Based on this, the UN asked North Korea to submit 
its VNR in 2020, and thus, we expect North Korea’s VNR to be published in 
2020 (Interview 19). It was said that a task force was assembled comprising 
different Ministries to reflect progress on all 17 SDGs, and a draft outline was 
prepared. However, the interviewee stated that North Korea’s VNR will be 
more at the level of a baseline report (Interview 19). Nevertheless, one of the 
benchmark examples can be found in the Global Burden of Diseases (GBD) 
2015 SDG Collaborators (2016) which analysed 33 health-related SDG indi-
cators in 188 countries from 1990 to 2015. Based on the GBD 2015 SDG 
Collaborators research, North Korea has been ranked 116th out of 188, while 
its sister country, South Korea, was ranked 35th (GBD 2015 SDG Collabora-
tors, 2016: 1825-1830). 
While North Korea’s SDG VNR has not yet been published at the time of 
writing, two important documents can show progress, change, and anticipa-
tion in North Korea regarding the SDGs: ‘Strategic Framework for Coopera-
tion between the United Nations and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 2017-2021’ (DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2018); 
and ‘DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2018’ (Humanitarian Country Team, 
2018). While the VNR is being supported by the UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the UN Strategic Frame-
work (UNSF) was coordinated by the UNDP (Interview 18; 19) and the Needs 
and Priorities report was prepared by the humanitarian country team located 
in North Korea.  
The UNSF provides priorities to support the efforts of the government of 
North Korea in terms of improving the well-being of the people, agreed be-
tween the UN Country Team in North Korea and the National Coordinating 
Committee (NCC) led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Korea. The 
UNSF does not specify detailed programmes but provides a framework as 
guidance to the UN’s work in North Korea. Based on the framework depicted 
in the UNSF, each UN body in North Korea builds its own programmes. For 
the 2017-2021 UNSF in North Korea, the Team has set out four strategic pri-
orities in which the SDG values and principles are embedded. While the four 
strategic priorities are food and nutrition security, social development ser-
vices, resilience and sustainability, and data and development management, 
these are stretched under the theme of ‘sustainable and resilient human devel-
opment’ in North Korea. The way each strategic priority is connected to the 
SDGs can be found in Table 1 (DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coor-
dinator, 2018). Within the UNSF, it is clearly stated that joint efforts will be 
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provided in areas such as human rights-based approaches, gender equality and 
the empowerment of women, environmental sustainability, institutional sus-
tainability, result-based management, and value for money, which covers 
Goals 5, 10, 14, and 16. However, Goals 1, 8 and 17 are still outstanding 
(DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2018). 
 
Table 1. UNSF Four Strategic Priorities and SDGs in North Korea, 2017-2021 
(Author’s own compilation based on DPRK and UN Office of the Resi-
dent Coordinator, 2018) 
 
UNSF Four Strategic Priorities Relevant SDGs 
Food and Nutrition Security 
SDG 2: Zero hunger 
SDG 9: Industry, innovation and infrastruc-
ture 
Social Development Services 
SDG 3: Good health and well-being 
SDG 4: Quality education 
SDG 6: Clean water and sanitation 
Resilience and Sustainability 
SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy 
SDG 11: Sustainable cities and communities 
SDG 12: Responsible consumption and pro-
duction 
SDG 13: Climate action 
SDG 15: Life on land 
Data and Development 
Management 
SDG goal is not specified in the UNSF 
 
In particular, the reason why it is impossible to achieve Goal 17 in North 
Korea is due to the current international sanctions. In the document, it is 
clearly stated that ‘one reason for this flexible approach is the relative uncer-
tainty regarding the financial resources available to the UN in DPR Korea’ 
(DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2018: 11). Even though 
the UNSF does not mention ‘sanctions’, it has pointed out the ‘challenging 
external environment’ (DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 
2018: 11), which clearly implies existing security concerns and sanctions. 
Here, the ‘flexible approach’ means that the Team sets out a guideline frame-
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work only by avoiding providing specific programme plans due to the uncer-
tain financial support plan. As such, the current UNSF is about ‘transferring 
international principles and values, standards and know-how’, but not about 
‘resource transfer’ (DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2018: 
8). As no such concrete funding prediction can be envisaged, it is said that 
periodic appeals for humanitarian assistance ‘may’ be launched (DPRK and 
UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, 2018: 9). This can be confirmed from 
the interview mentioned above about the possibility of closing the UNDP of-
fice in Pyongyang (Interview 18). This makes the need for the understanding 
of state fragility context in this process in North Korea all the more compel-
ling.  
In Table 1, it is noteworthy that the UNSF does not provide a clear link to 
the SDGs on the final strategic priority; data and development management. 
However, it is obvious that data management is a critical part of SDG ac-
countability, especially at the stage of answerability in the accountability 
mechanism, and also partially for Goal 16. As a matter of fact, the UNSF 
made it clear that in its monitoring and evaluation process for the Team’s 
support to the government of North Korea, it maintains the operating princi-
ple of ‘no access, no assistance’ (DPRK and UN Office of the Resident Co-
ordinator, 2018: 27).  
In comparison, the Needs and Priorities analysis was led by the UN Resi-
dent Coordinator by emphasizing the need for continuous international finan-
cial life-saving support to the most vulnerable people in North Korea. Unlike 
the UNSF, it clearly states that the sanctions imposed on North Korea have 
worked as a significant obstacle in humanitarian activities in practice. Ac-
cording to the report, about USD 111 million is required for the most ‘urgent’ 
food, health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene needs for about six mil-
lion people. Among those, 1.7 million are children under five are and 342,000 
pregnant and breastfeeding women (Humanitarian Country Team, 2018: 3). 
Accordingly, the Needs and Priorities report has set out four main priority 
sectors to support: food security; nutrition; health; and water, sanitation and 
hygiene (WASH) (Humanitarian Country Team, 2018). As seen previously, 
the four priority sectors highlighted by the Needs and Priorities report are 
significantly related to the first two strategic priorities of the UNSF; however, 
the report itself does not link its priorities to the SDGs.  
Even though the report stated that the support for humanitarian efforts in 
North Korea needs to be considered in isolation from the political environ-
ment, it does not define the country as fragile. However, the report evidently 
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depicts the situation in North Korea as fragile, and thus development cooper-
ation support needs to be considered in the context of state fragility (Human-
itarian Country Team, 2018: 16). Similar to the UNSF, the Needs and Priori-
ties report also emphasizes the monitoring process. The report described the 
challenges in physical and administrative data accessibility with a steady pro-
gress in practice. As in the UNSF, the report also implies the need for gov-
ernment capacity building in data management (Humanitarian Country Team, 
2018). This, in turn, implies that accountability can be achieved when it is 





This paper has examined whether we can still apply SDG discourse to 
North Korea even though it is under sanctions and, if so, in what context and 
how this could be achieved. The findings of the study reveal that North Korea 
can engage in the SDG process, but with certain conditions. North Korea pre-
sents an interesting case in the context of SDG implementation under sanc-
tions. If we truly intend to include North Korea in the SDG process, a separate 
accountability mechanism needs to be employed. This paper argues that a ro-
bust accountability mechanism should be present in the case of fragile states 
that applies ‘transitional accountability’. Here, transitional accountability can 
be applied to countries like North Korea which lack state capacity for equip-
ping the required soft and hard infrastructure for accountability. In other 
words, North Korea as a fragile state and also with special economic condi-
tions (sanctions) needs a differentiated but constructive path of accountability 
as a form of tailored approach. The very recent sanctions imposed in 2017, 
for example, can be understood as a maximum pressure as they are beyond 
smart sanctions and are negatively influencing daily life of civilians. The in-
ternational community has imposed a punitive approach against North Korea 
regardless accountability mechanism stages and has not fully attempted a con-
structive one yet. By applying the constructive approach, transitional account-
ability could work better in the context of state fragility. For instance, in the 
second stage of accountability (answerability), we can introduce incentive 
system at the beginning of the process with an attempt of partial sanctions lift 
in limited sectors. Yet, this will require a change of mindset, or even a para-
digm shift, from the leading policy makers on current sanctions regime. 
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At the same time, technical cooperation for capacity development needs to 
be provided. In its analysis of the FRA in North Korea, this paper has found 
that North Korea can commit itself to data sharing and transparency as it is 
willing to publish its VNR. However, as noted in recent publications, data and 
information access is still highly restricted in North Korea, and the data and 
information included in the VNR needs to be confirmed by a shadow report 
drawn up by a group of independent thematic experts. A shadow reporting 
system is a well-known method of peer review. However, as CSOs and NGOs 
seem to be vulnerable in North Korea, we can also think of establishing a 
steering committee so that they can be more independent from the current 
political system, but also can develop their capacity to become an independ-
ent body in the transitional accountability process in the country, supported 
by international and bilateral donor government bodies. In this way, a culture 
of accountability can formally and informally grow in the society and the 
government. This can be critical in the case of North Korea as we cannot be 
sure whether the current regime has any political will to achieve a culture of 
accountability in the government system. Moreover, a definition and concep-
tualisation of accountability needs to be embedded in the country. As the the-
ory shows, appropriate conceptualisation of accountability must be prepared 
as a prerequisite, along with a culture of accountability. 
If this transitional accountability works successfully at its second stage (an-
swerability), we can move to the third stage of the accountability process (en-
forceability) by maintaining a constructive pathway, rather than starting from 
the existing punitive enforceability methods (sanctions). In other words, once 
North Korea reveals sufficient data and information about its development 
progress under the SDG mandates, and we can confirm them with a third 
party, we can provide more incentives by providing financial support, along 
with further technical cooperation. If the government of North Korea fails to 
provide full access to data and information transparently, then, the interna-
tional community can suggest a snapback process. The whole process will 
need to accompany the process of legalising accountability in the government 
structure. 
Accountability is not limited to the SDG implementation issue but can be 
understood in the wider context of the state’s building of institutions. In the 
case of North Korea, we can introduce transitional accountability by focusing 
on selective sectors. Based on its experience and practice in selective sectors 
of the government system, it can be expanded to the whole of the govern-
ment’s institutional development. As long as the concept of accountability is 
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embedded and a culture of accountability is mainstreamed in the society, a 
state can escape from its weak status in the fragility index, and thus can 
achieve de facto development in the country.  
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